The article deals with the US policy towards Korean Armistice negotiations during the war on the peninsula (1950–1953). The author analyzes such an important aspect of this problem as Washington's course regarding the irreconcilable position of South Korean President Syngman Rhee who demanded to continue war to a victorious end. The author assesses the perspectives of the «Everready» plan, which was the US scenario for the forced Syngman Rhee’s resignation. This plan was, on the one hand, the most radical and, on the other hand, the fastest and most effective way to solve the Syngman Rhee problem. Like any other force solution, it had two fundamental flaws: it was risky and required significant resources. The research is based on published and unpublished documents of the US State Department, declassified CIA materials, and memoirs. In general, the US administration seriously considered the option of removing the South Korean leader from power, but, at the end of the discussion on the issue, a less risky option was chosen. Syngman Rhee agreed to stop interfering in stabilizing the situation on the peninsula and ceasing hostilities after difficult negotiations and significant US concessions. The South Korean president was able to strengthen the security of his country and to significantly increase own political authority. However, his blackmail was not a complete success. Syngman Rhee never managed to achieve the main goal – Korean unification under his rule. In these circumstances, even after the end of the Korean War, the «Everready» plan did not immediately lose its relevance for the United States authorities.
Key words: Korea, Syngman Rhee, Eisenhower, coup d'état, the Korean War.